This article explores Claudia Card's hypothesis that social death is the distinctive harm of genocide. Drawing on original in-depth interviews with individuals from the genocide-affected regions of Darfur and the Nuba Mountains in Sudan (now living in, and interviewed in, the US and the UK), I illustrate the value and validity of the concept of social death as a phenomenological lens for understanding the depth, extent and character of genocide's harms for its victims and survivors. Aided by the work of a number of authors (including Elias and Jean-Luc Nancy), I outline a relational interpretation of Card's important scholarship in order to show that understanding the distinctiveness of genocide requires that we also consider, in ontological terms, what it means to be human. I seek to do this in a way that may form the basis of a flexible definitional approach to genocide, and which overcomes oppositions between individualist and collectivist approaches to conceptualising harm. Often falling through the gaps of technical legal discourse and conventional frameworks of understanding, the profound, existential harm of genocide can be challenging to grasp. By centring the concept of social death, this article aims to contribute to our ability to do.
Suddenly you find yourself as if you are alone in this world. This is the equivalent to death. You may come to the conclusion that it is better for you to die

Introduction
Genocide is in public, political, and scholarly discourse perceived as a 'special form of wrongdoing, a class of moral evil unto itself.' 6 Yet the reasons why, exactly, genocide has this unique moral status, and is as such deserving of a singular moral opprobrium, are often only superficially interrogated. Whilst there have indeed been thoughtful and important philosophical interventions on the issue by a number of scholars, 7 dominant and conventional answers to this question remain centred on the view that genocide denotes a unique form of mass killing that is state-directed, ethnically motivated, systematic and pre-meditated. This mass killing, moreover, is deemed genocidal only if it is accompanied and driven by a particularly evil mind set, namely, the perpetrators' intent to physically destroy the targeted group. of an official genocide determination. 9 However, often implicitly underpinned by narrow and sociologically problematic legalistic paradigms, these debates have tended to overlook alternative, potentially richer approaches to apprehending and understanding genocide, including those that draw on the original conceptualisation of Raphael Lemkin, who emphasised the fundamentally social and cultural nature of genocidal destruction. 10 Indeed, for
Lemkin, who coined the term in the 1940s, techniques of genocidal destruction could be: political, social, cultural, economic, biological, physical, religious, and moral.
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Moses aptly captures Lemkin's formulation of genocide as a 'total social practice,'
affecting all aspects of group life. 12 Lemkin's broad approach thus contrasts with the skew towards physical destruction evident in the UN Convention. Moreover, whilst it may be the case that, as Jones writes, 'Most scholars and legal theorists agree that intent defines genocide,' 13 for Powell, the logical conclusion of the focus on intent is that:
The outcome of a course of action matters less than the intent behind it; put another way, the experiences of the victims count for less than the moral quality of the accused perpetrator.
14 This is not to suggest that the issue of intent is unimportant or irrelevant to our broader understanding. 15 However, the focus on intent as the uniquely 'evil' and defining feature of genocide arguably (perhaps unintentionally) obscures the perspectives and experiences of victims.
In contrast, here I explore an approach that seeks explicitly to ground our show that understanding the distinctiveness of genocide requires that we also consider, in ontological terms, what it means to be human. I seek to do this in a way that may form the basis of a flexible definitional approach, and which overcomes oppositions between individualist and collectivist approaches to conceptualising harm, and specifically the harm of social death.
Using the lens of social death draws out with greater salience the depth of the experience of loss and harm associated with genocide. It also helps us explain why and how social and cultural destruction can be genocidal. The profound, existential harm of genocide can be challenging to grasp, and often falls through the gaps of technical legal discourse and conventional frameworks of understanding. As the testimony presented illustrates, centring social death adds a valuable and complementary phenomenological layer of understanding to Raphael Lemkin's broad social and cultural conceptualisation. A renewed focus on such experiential dimensions has potential not only to deepen appreciation of the meaning of genocidal destruction for its victims, but also to contribute to an understanding of why such destruction and the harm it inflicts is distinctive. Doing so may also further understanding of how processes of genocide unfold over time, and how best to support victim/survivor communities in the context of reconstruction efforts in postgenocide situations.
'Social death' and the distinctive harm of genocide
Why do we need the specific crime or concept of genocide? What does the term capture above and beyond, for example, mass murder or crimes against humanity?
One way authors have approached this question is through examination of the primary 'object' that is damaged or harmed by genocide. MacLeod notes that there exists a 'general consensus' in the scholarly literature on this issue that genocide should be characterized either in terms of damage done to individuals, or damage done to groups targeted by genocide. 16 As Steven P. Lee writes:
What or who is the chief object of harm when genocide is committed, individuals or the groups to which they belong? Is genocide distinguished by harm to the group itself, with the harm done to its members only a means to the harm to the group (as with collectivist accounts), or is genocide distinguished by the harm done to its individual victims? 17 Aligned with the individualist approach, the question that Card believed to be central in any argument to the effect that genocide is distinctive is this:
Is any ethically distinct harm done to members of the targeted group that would not have been done had they been targeted simply as individuals rather than because of their group membership? 18 Her answer is that there is indeed a harm that is ethically distinct:
What distinguishes genocide is not that it has a different kind of victim, namely, groups (although it is a convenient shorthand to speak of targeting groups The intentional production of social death in a people or community is the central evil of genocide. That is so not only when a genocide is mainly cultural but even when it is homicidal on a massive scale. Social death distinguishes the evil of genocide, morally, from the evils of other mass murders. Even genocidal murder can be understood as an extreme means to the primary goal of social death. 24 Card also questions the assumption that social death is less extreme than physical death; a sentiment, it will be seen, also expressed by some of genocide's survivors.
Card's account of social death shifts attention away from perpetrator intentions, individual deaths and mass violence, towards losses of 'relationships, connections, and the foundational institutions' which create community, and through 20 Powell's discussion of the relational sociology of Norbert Elias -in particular his concept of a 'figuration' -provides a complementary theoretical dimension to these ideas. Elias emphasised that individuals do not exist prior to social relations, and that individual and collective identity depend upon one another. Summarizing, Powell writes, 'Individuals form their personal subjectivity through relations with others in a definite social context, and identification with others is a crucial part of this process.
[…] Only in relation to a collective self is it possible for me to be my individual self.'
To destroy a collective identity, therefore, 'is to violently destroy a crucial part of the individual self.' 46 According to Powell therefore, the object that genocide destroys is a 'figuration': a 'dynamic social network that sustains a collective identity.'
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Drawing on Elias, he writes:
Our very subjectivity is formed out of the practical and taken-for-granted set of skills, attitudes, understandings by which each of us conducts our life, and these develop only through our relationships with each other. The essential human condition is not being, but being with others. Drawing these ideas together, the core point emphasized here is that social death cannot be reduced to either the individual or the collective level. In recognizing individuals and the 'worlds' within which they are embedded as ontologically co- 
A flexible definitional approach
The harm-based conceptualization outlined here may help provide the basis for a flexible definitional approach to genocide. A flexible approach -one that avoids ideas of there being a universal, timeless form of genocide -is important for a number of reasons. Henry Theriault has cogently argued that because genocide is a shifting social construct, rather than a fixed natural object, we need a flexible approach to Centring social death in the way that has been suggested here enables us to remain open but grounded; alert to the potential multiple and contingent manifestations and futures of genocide, but attuned above all to that which is surely most important: the consequences for victims. 59 Focusing precisely on this, the following sections will bring the preceding theoretical discussion to life through the experiences of victims/survivors from the genocide-affected regions of Darfur and the Nuba Mountains in Sudan. The lens of social death, it will be seen, provides a valuable conceptual vocabulary with which to illuminate and make sense of their experiences.
Loss of identity: a social and cultural assault
Whilst horrific accounts of physical violence, torture and killings were frequently recounted by interviewees for this study, it was nevertheless the social, cultural, and identity-based aspects of destruction that tended to be at the centre of their narratives and experiences of loss, pain and harm. In a significant sense, therefore, a focus on the physical alone is unable to capture the depth, range or dimensions of the harm experienced. The majority of interviewees made clear they did not experience (often harrowing) violence targeted at their communities and villages in straightforwardly physical terms; they did not regard it as exclusively an attempt to physically destroy or remove them. Rather, they experienced it, acutely, as an attack on their culture, way of life, their identity, and even their humanity. As one man from Darfur commented, 'You are not a human being just by eating and drinking. Echoing the views of many others, this individual perceived genocide as an attack on the 'way of life', 'collective spirit', and 'social fabric of the group.' Attacks were experienced as inflicting not just physical wounds, but also psychological wounds;
'pain', 'defeat', and 'destruction' extended to the whole of society. In the passage above, the physical and the social/cultural appear to bleed into one, undifferentiated assault that has unfolded over time. This theme was a recurring one. A man from Darfur commented: 'They want to destroy your way of life. To erase you, actually.'
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Another man from the Nuba Mountains told me that the social fabric and rich culture that once existed in the region 'is gone, it will never be like before.' This person felt this way despite being part of the fairly large and cohesive diaspora community in the UK. Indeed, he was well connected in the community, active in human rights work, and had a professional career in medicine. Despite the large diaspora community, however, he said he was not able to properly practice his 
Loss of Language
Importantly related to the experience of identity loss was the theme of language loss, the significance of which came up repeatedly in interviews, and was perceived as commented that the attack on language was an 'attack on our identity.' Even though the community in the diaspora made efforts to keep it alive with small classes for their children, he feared his language, Kadugli, would soon be lost.
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The suppression and degradation of tribal languages was frequently described in terms of an attack on the very foundations of community and the ties that held it together. Many interviewees also talked of how their tribal languages had become synonymous with backwardness. In this context, many referred to the Arabic word rotana, a pejorative term used by school teachers (who often came from Khartoum) and broader society in the north to describe African tribal languages. Interviewees understood this term to mean 'animal language.' They were told that their language 74 it is an identity problem. They don't even let you say the word 'language' to refer to traditional tribal language. They say 'this is not a language, this is rotana,' which is like the animal talk. They try to make you feel you are not even human, you are an animal. 
Generational loss
Loss of language was also discussed in the context of deep concern about the future, and fears that the interviewees' distinctive cultures would eventually die as future generations would be unable to fully absorb and meaningfully 'live' traditions and languages. Indeed, intersecting with the broader theme of identity loss, the issue of generational loss emerged as a significant theme in its own right. Several interviewees also talked about the destructive consequences for society as a whole as a result of the situation of younger generations. In particular, many people were deeply worried about the long-term consequences of a pervasive lack of education for the future of their communities.
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Also of great concern was the loss of practical knowledge, such as farming.
Younger generations, some said, will not know how to maintain the patterns and structures of society, and they would not be able to contribute culturally or economically to its development and advancement into the future. 89 A significant point communicated by several individuals interviewed for this study was that the issue of rape should not be viewed as an 'add-on,' or something to be considered in addition to the 'main' violence of genocide or the overall conflict.
Rather, both men and women saw mass rape and sexual violence not only as the worst thing that has happened to their communities, but also as representative or symbolic of the overall assault -its character, the harm it has produced, its purpose, and the meaning it holds for them as its targets and victims:
Targeting women for rape is one of the most destructive elements for the The comments of interviewees suggested that mass rape inflicts multiple harms, consistent with an understanding of genocide as social death. In addition to the common description of mass rape as the most painful and destructive dimension of the overall assault, many also described it as 'worse than death.' It was common for women to state that it was preferable to be killed after having been raped, rather than to live with the consequences. Such responses, however, particularly the notion that it is better to die than to be raped, should be contextualized in relation to the patriarchal social dynamics and hierarchies that structure communal responses to rape within targeted communities in Sudan. In fact, several interviewees, both men and women, spoke frankly of the aspect of their culture that stigmatizes and ostracizes rape victims as deeply negative and destructive, and something that should be subject to concerted intervention directed particularly at men. Some suggested it was knowledge of this aspect of their culture that motivated mass rapes; consciously exploiting these cultural norms, the perpetrators knew rape would rip communities apart. 105 Nevertheless, in light of the frequency of assertions in the testimony collected to the effect that rape and its consequences are 'worse than death,' we are compelled to take seriously (as Card does) the idea that social death may be worse than physical death, and to ask afresh the question of why genocide, and specifically genocidal rape, can bring about such an experience. Considering the mass rape in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, Card writes:
They left many female survivors little more than gestating corpses, social outcasts, unmarriageable, their offspring unassimilable. What had those survivors to look forward to other than life-long post-traumatic stress?
Would their fate have been worse had they been killed? 106 Women and girls who have been victims of rape and in some cases made pregnant through rape, may become 'socially dead' insofar as they are deemed to have lost 'value,' or are seen to be 'valueless,' by the broader society. Such women are often rejected from the community, and thus completely dislocated from the unified social context upon which their individual identities depended.
Interviewees furthermore noted that the shame and humiliation associated with rape was not just experienced at an individual level, but was also particularly acute at the level of the community, compounding social fragmentation and widespread demoralization. As Card writes, 'Rape humiliates. Public, unremitting, irreparable, deep humiliation is among the techniques of genocide.' 107 Mass rape in this way can erode community bonds of trust. It also disrupts the processes by which a social collectivity reproduces itself and maintains its social vitality over time by impeding the formation of future families, and traumatizing families that do form.
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Many interviewees also talked about how, in their societies, women were symbolic of the 'heart' or the 'core' of the community. Thus, to attack and degrade women in this way was also to attack the very foundation or core of the community as a whole. Its humiliating effects, the physical and psychological 'torture' it inflicts, and the way it exerts 'control over the future of communities by tampering with the production of the next generation,' are all ways in which genocidal rape forms part of a broader assault 'that has the clearly foreseeable consequence, if not also the explicit aim, of destroying vitality in a people.' 109 Systematic rape can fragment and demoralize societies to such an extent that they lose the collective will to resist or [A] source of identity and self-sustaining resources; it is an historic territory, a homeland, a rightful possession of one's forefathers through generations. It is distinctive and a unique territory; and the identity of the nation is bound up with memory, and this memory is rooted in a homeland.
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In Sudan, according to Komey, the term 'region' has 'emerged as a self-identifying concept that serves as a focus of cultural, economic, religious, political and historical The land is life, the land is your life. Because we depend on this land. We farm this land, we collect the fire wood from this land. We collect fruit from this land. This is my life in the land. Touching on the issues of 'anticipatory denial' discussed above, he also talked about how, in the context of greater international attention on Khartoum's atrocities, the government has tried to 'find another way' that is not killing, but 'parallel to killing.'
The government, in his view, has attempted to 'destroy the people' economically, and by denying education and healthcare. The international community is less responsive to this kind of destruction; they will only pay attention to massacres, he said. In contrast, the argument presented here reveals the obfuscation implicit in these statements. The idea that genocide 'ends' when coordinated mass killings or physical attacks more generally cease, involves the discursive erasure of a profound and often irreparable harm.
Social 'Death'? Reconstruction and Revitalisation
But is it the case that such harm is always irreparable? 'Death' suggests a permanent ending, an unrecoverable state. To describe victims and survivors of genocide as 'socially dead' implies they will never -can never -be socially 'alive' again. Thus,
we have something of a conceptual binary (dead/alive), which closes off the conceptual and phenomenological terrain between the two. This may be interpreted as insufficiently recognising individuals' and communities' potential resilience, evidence of which abounded in the communities engaged with for this study.
However, this would be to misconstrue Card on this issue, for she includes in her account the possibility that identity and social vitality be reclaimed and The community I engaged with in New York in particular is probably somewhat unique within the context of the worldwide Sudanese diaspora community.
One interviewee described it as a 'special' community:
In Many also talked about how they had been able to retain a sense of connection to their identity and cultural heritage. Some from the Nuba Mountains, for example, described how on arrival in the USA or the UK, they changed their names back to their original Nuba names, discarding the Arabic ones they had been forced to adopt. 151 In fact, some felt that the conflict, the attack on their community, and their role as a voice outside the country for those they had left behind in Sudan had led to a stronger, In his book, Radical Hope, Jonathan Lear argues it is the avoidance of despair that enables a community to respond to the collapse of a way of life. Crucially, for
Lear, the avoidance of despair is possible only in the presence of a hope that is 'directed toward a future goodness that transcends the current ability to understand what it is.' Such a hope is 'radical': 'Radical hope anticipates a good for which those who have the hope as yet lack the appropriate concepts with which to understand it.' 155 Radical hope is possible, however, only if it is rooted in the group's own resources, culture and traditions; amidst great uncertainty, new meanings and possibilities must be drawn from old concepts, definitions and ideas that on their own, no longer make sense. This amounts to a creative renewal that can transcend cultural
collapse, and open up new pathways for the continuation of a cohesive collectivity, albeit in a form that is not known or determined in advance.
Whilst such a hope may indeed have underpinned processes of cultural reconstruction in the Darfuri and Nuba Mountains diaspora communities, many interviewees nevertheless communicated they were unable to feel the same bonds of community attachment, or experience the natural sense of identification to the wider society and surroundings that they had previously in Sudan. The majority made clear they longed to return to home. Many also expressed uncertainty about the future, and it remains to be seen whether the processes of re-growth and revitalization described can be sustained into the future.
Moreover, it seems the emergence of radical hope, and in particular the possibility that it could be concretely acted upon or manifested, is not entirely context-independent, even though it may itself be the product of significant upheaval.
Arguably, certain very basic conditions must be met, such as relative physical safety, sustenance, and the (even if rudimentary) means and resources (broadly conceived)
for building new patterns of collective life. However, for those in the refugee and IDP camps in and around Sudan, these conditions simply do not exist. Nevertheless, Lear's concept of radical hope arguably illuminates a crucial dimension of Card's (insufficiently theorized) notion of 'revitalization,' offering valuable insights to those seeking to build or support such a process. The concrete means by which such a hope may spark or galvanize broader process of reconstruction should be a central empirical and theoretical concern of genocide studies.
Conclusion
The aim of this article has not been to reduce genocide's distinctiveness or the harm it causes to social death, or indeed to preclude the possibility (indeed likelihood) that It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the concrete implications of such a conception for the meaning and practice of any form of 'anti-genocide' action.
The more modest aim here has been to demonstrate the value and validity of the lens social death for capturing the experiences of genocide's victims and survivors, and for providing a (flexible) conceptual anchor that can support our ability to make sense of -and keep our focus attuned to -the depth, extent, and existential nature of (at least one of) genocide's distinctive harms. If the norms and practices of our responses to genocide are to be ethically sufficient, they must be based on a conception of genocide that recognizes these harms. It is hoped this article contributes towards the general reorientation required for this to be possible.
